Very little is known about the efficient collection of fines despite their indispensable contribution to local
government budgets. This paper fills an important gap in the literature by studying the effectiveness of
deterrence (enforcement) and non-deterrence (social norms) letters that aim to improve the collection of
traffic and parking fines. We discuss potential mechanisms through which these letters may affect fine
compliance and present results from a natural field experiment that was implemented in collaboration with
the government of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). We find that both letters increase fine payments
significantly relative to a control group that did not receive a letter. The effect of the enforcement letter is
stronger than that of the social norms letter. Our analysis of heterogenous treatment effects indicates that
addressing social norms does not change the behavior of young offenders, those who committed a
speeding offence, those with a long outstanding debt and those with a debt above the median. In contrast,
the enforcement letter is generally effective across subgroups.